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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(3) and Utah R. App. P. 3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether a loss of consortium claim of one spouse and the bodily injury claim of the 
other are subject to the same "single person" policy limit under Utah insurance and financial 
responsibility laws and the insurance policy in question, and if not, whether the trial court 
erred in finding that Appellants Arthur Vierra and Corina Vierra must share a single person 
policy limit under Appellant Don Versaw's liability insurance policy? 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. (See, for example, R. at 158-202, 225-9, 
pp. 1-26.) 
The standard of review for motions for judgment on the pleadings and for the 
interpretation of statutes, which both present questions of law, is correctness. Parks v. Utah 
Transit Authority. 2002 UT 55, U 4. 53 P.3d 473, 474. The trial court is afforded no 
deference when determining questions of law. Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234, 1243 (Utah 
1998), cert, denied, 119 S.Ct. 1803 (1999). State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). 
The interpretation of an insurance contract is also a question of law reviewed for correctness, 
with no deference to the trial court. AOK Lands, Inc. v. Shand, Moraham & Co., 860 P.2d 
924, 925 (Utah 1993). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AND DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Article IV, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution: 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold office shall not be 
denied or abridged on account of sex. Both male and female citizens of this 
State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and privileges. 
2. The Married Woman's Act, Utah Code Ann. $30-2-4: 
A wife may receive the wages for her personal labor, maintain an action 
therefor in her own name and hold the same in her own right, and may 
prosecute and defend all actions for the preservation and protection of her 
rights and property as if unmarried. There shall be no right of recovery by the 
husband on account of personal injury or wrong to his wife, or for expenses 
connected therewith, but the wife may recover against a third person for such 
injury or wrong as if unmarried, and such recovery shall include expenses of 
medical treatment and other expenses paid or assumed by the husband. 
3. Utah's Loss of Consortium Act Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11: 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "injury" or "injured" means a significant permanent injury to a 
person that substantially changes that person's lifestyle and includes 
the following: 
(i) a partial or complete paralysis of one or more of the 
extremities; 
(ii) significant disfigurement; or 
(iii) incapability of the person of performing the types of jobs 
the person performed before the injury; and 
(b) "spouse" means the legal relationship: 
(i) established between a man and a woman as recognized 
by the laws of this state; and 
(ii) existing at the time of the person's injury. 
(2) The spouse of a person injured by a third party on or after May 4,1997, 
may maintain an action against the third party to recover for loss of 
consortium. 
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(3) A claim for loss of consortium begins on the date of injury to the spouse. The 
statute of limitations applicable to the injured person shall also apply to the 
spouse's claim of loss of consortium. 
(4) A claim for the spouse's loss of consortium shall be: 
(a) made at the time the claim of the injured person is made and 
joinder of actions shall be compulsory; and 
(b) subject to the same defenses, limitations, immunities, and 
provisions applicable to the claims of the injured person. 
(5) The spouse's action for loss of consortium: 
(a) shall be derivative from the cause of action existing in behalf of 
the injured person; and 
(b) may not exist in cases where the injured person would not have 
a cause of action. 
(6) Fault of the spouse of the injured person, as well as fault of the injured 
person, shall be compared with the fault of all other parties, pursuant to 
Section 78-27-37 through 78-27-43, for purposes of reducing or barring any 
recovery by the spouse for loss of consortium. 
(7) Damages awarded for loss of consortium, when combined with any 
award to the injured person for general damages, may not exceed any 
applicable statutory limit on noneconomic damages, including 
Section 78-14-7.1. 
(8) Damages awarded for loss of consortium which a governmental entity 
is required to pay, when combined with any award to the injured person which 
a governmental entity is required to pay, may not exceed the liability limit for 
one person in any one occurrence under Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
4. Motor Vehicle Liability Coverage. Utah Code Ann. S31A-22-303: 
(l)(a) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21 and Part 
II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 
31A-22-302(l)(a) shall: 
(i) name the motor vehicle owner or operator in whose name the 
policy was purchased, state that named insured's address, the coverage 
afforded, the premium charged, the policy period, and the limits of 
liability; 
(ii)(A) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate reference all 
the motor vehicles on which coverage is granted, insure the person 
named in the policy, insure any other person using any named motor 
vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured . 
. . against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising 
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out of the ownership, maintenance or use of these motor vehicles 
within the United States and Canada, subject to limits exclusive of 
interest and costs, for each motor vehicle, in amounts not less than the 
minimum limits specified under Section 31A-22-304. . . . 
5. Motor Vehicle Liability Policy Minimum Limits, Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-304: 
Policies containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not limit the insurer's 
liability under that coverage below the following: 
(1) (a) $25,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or death 
of one person, arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one 
accident; 
(b) subject to the limit for one person in Subsection (a), in 
the amount of $50,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or death 
of two or more persons arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any 
one accident; and 
(c) in the amount of $ 15,000 because of liability for injury 
to, or destruction of, property of others arising out of the use of a motor 
vehicle in any one accident; or 
(2) $65,000 in any one accident whether arising from bodily injury 
to or the death of others, or from destruction of, or damage to, the 
property of others. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal presents an issue of first impression in Utah. This issue is whether the 
personal injury claim of one spouse can be combined with the loss of consortium claim of 
the other spouse, and thereby treated by an automobile liability insurer as a "single person" 
claim, subject to one "per person" or "single person" policy limit. 
The appeal is from a Declaratory Action brought by Farmers Insurance Exchange 
("Farmers") against Arthur and Corina Vierra and Farmers' named insured Don Versaw. 
Mr. Versaw purchased automobile liability insurance in Utah from Farmers in the amount 
-4-
of $30,000 "per person" and $60,000 "per occurrence." Farmers claims that Mr. Versaw is 
entitled to only one "per person" or "single person" policy limit for a collision which 
resulted in severe personal injury to Mrs. Vierra and a significant loss of consortium for Mr. 
Vierra. Mr. Versaw's and the Vierras' claim that Farmers owes Mr. Versaw liability 
protection in amounts up to $30,000 for Mrs. Vierra's claim and separate coverage up to 
$30,000 for Mr. Vierra's claim because of this occurrence. 
Mrs. Vierra offered to settle her claims against Mr. Versaw in exchange for a single 
person policy limit of $30,000. Farmers responded with a $30,000 offer to Mrs. Vierra but 
made its settlement offer contingent upon Mr. Vierra releasing his loss of consortium claim. 
An action by the Vierras against Mr. Versaw followed. It is pending in the Third District 
Court as Corina Vierra and Arthur Vierra v. Don Versaw. Civil No. 000908311. 
Subsequently, Farmers brought the Declaratory Action which gives rise to this appeal. 
II. Course of the Proceedings. 
After this Declaratory Action was brought by Farmers in December of 2000, Mr. 
Versaw filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (R. at 9-48.) In response, Farmers 
filed a cross motion for judgment on the pleadings. (R. at 54-79.) Thereafter, the Vierras 
filed their own motion for judgment on the pleadings and joined in Mr. Versaw's motion. 
(R. at 158-202.) The motions were decided by the trial court on stipulated facts. 
III. Disposition of the Trial Court. 
The trial court heard oral argument on April 12,2002 (R. at 254, pp. 1-28.) and ruled 
on July 9, 2002. (R. at 237-8.) Judgment in favor of Farmers was entered on August 28, 
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2002. (R. at 240-2.) A Notice of Appeal was jointly filed by the Vierras and Mr. Versaw 
on September 11, 2002. (R. at 245-7.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Farmers accepted the following facts as true for purposes of the Declaratory Action: 
(R. 160-1,205 and 231.) 
1. Mrs. Vierra was injured on October 7, 1998 in an automobile collision with 
Farmers' Don Versaw. (R. at 160.) 
2. Mrs. Vierra sustained injuries, including a closed head injury, and as of 
January 2000, had incurred medical expenses in excess of $25,070. (R. at 161.) 
3. At the time of the collision, Mrs. Vierra was an employee of the Federal 
Aviation Administration, earning a base salary in excess of $30,000 a year. (R. at 161.) 
4. As a result of her injuries, Mrs. Vierra has been unable to return to her job or 
seek other employment. (R. at 161.) 
5. As of January 2000, Mrs. Vierra had lost income in excess of $50,248 and 
since then has continued to lose income at the rate of approximately $121.00 a day. (R. at 
161.) 
6. Mr. Versaw was insured by Farmers at the time of the collision with liability 
coverage of $30,000 per person and $60,000 per occurrence. (R. at 161.) 
7. Mrs. Vierra made claim against Mr. Versaw for payment of one of Mr. 
Versaw's $30,000 per person policy limits in settlement of her personal injury claim. (R. 
at 161.) 
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8. At the same time, Mrs. Vierra's husband, Arthur Vierra, made claim against 
Mr. Versaw for payment of Mr. Versaw's remaining $30,000 per person policy limit in 
settlement of his loss of consortium claim. (R. at 161.) 
9. Mr. Vierra's loss of consortium claim is based on a loss of financial support 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-2-1 l(l)(a)(iii) because Mrs. Vierra sustained a significant 
permanent injury which has substantially changed her lifestyle in that since the collision 
Mrs. Vierra has been and is incapable of performing the types of jobs she performed prior 
to the collision. (R. at 161.) 
10. In response to Mrs. and Mr. Vierra's claims, Farmers offered them a single per 
person policy limit of $30,000. As a result, Mrs. and Mr. Vierra commenced suit against 
Mr. Versaw. This Declaratory Action followed. (R. at 161.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court erroneously ruled that under applicable Utah law, Farmers need only 
provide Mr. Versaw with a single separate person policy limit for the October 7, 1998 
collision which resulted in severe personal injury to Mrs. Vierra as well as significant loss 
of consortium to Mr. Vierra. To the contrary, because Mr. and Mrs. Vierra are two separate 
people, under applicable Utah law, the total liability coverage available to Mr. Versaw for 
the claims is not limited to a single person policy limit. Mr. Versaw's policy expressly 
provides limits of $30,000 "per person" and $60,000 "per accident." 
The Trial Court's ruling also erroneously allows Farmers to make a $30,000 single 
person policy limit settlement offer to Mrs. Vierra contingent upon her husband releasing 
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his loss of consortium claim. This is untenable. Utah law mandates that because personal 
injury and loss of consortium claims are separate and distinct claims, separate coverage 
limits must be furnished by the insurer. 
Separate limits in this case are required not only because Farmers sold Mr. Versaw 
"per person"/ "per occurrence" coverage pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31 A-202-304(l), but 
also because Farmers' policy language is hopelessly indefinite and ambiguous. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING 
FARMERS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
Analyzing an insurance policy in a declaratory action like this one typically involves 
two steps. First, the language is reviewed to determine its meaning and whether any 
ambiguities require coverage. Second, even if the language is unambiguous, the policy is 
reviewed again to determine whether the coverage, as stated in the policy, complies with the 
minimum requirements of the law. 
The policy language in this case cannot be readily analyzed for ambiguity under this 
first step because the language goes outside of the four corners of the policy and leaves to 
the insureds and the courts the burden of determining, on the basis of indefinite reference, 
whether one or two "single person" policy limits are available. Initially, Farmer's policy 
states: "The bodily injury liability limit for 'each person' is the maximum for bodily injury 
sustained by one person in any occurrence. Any claim for loss of consortium or injury to the 
relationship arising from this injury will be included in this limit." (R. at 184.) (Emphasis 
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omitted.) Then, the policy states: "If the financial responsibility law of the place of the 
accident treats the loss of consortium as a separate claim, financial responsibility limits 
will be furnished." (R. at 184) (Emphasis added.) 
This language on its face raises questions about Utah's financial responsibility 
statutes and how those statutes relate to loss of consortium claims. Therefore, a proper 
analysis of the policy and whether a loss of consortium is a "separate claim" in Utah requires 
an examination of (1) Utah's financial responsibility statutes, (2) Utah's loss of consortium 
statute, and (3) the constitutional and statutory provisions which inform the loss of 
consortium concept in Utah. 
The remaining argument is divided into five sections. Section I first provides a basic 
constitutional and statutory context for loss of consortium claims in Utah and then discusses 
the particular loss of consortium claim in this case. Section II address the statutes which 
taken together comprise Utah's financial responsibility law. In Sections III and IV, Utah's 
Loss of Consortium Act and the "derivative" nature of loss of consortium claims are 
discussed. Section V then considers the meaning of the statutory language in question and 
the ambiguity created by Farmers' failure to write a policy that clearly treats a loss of 
consortium is a "separate claim" in conformity with Utah law. 
To summarize what follows, Farmers' policy (or at least Farmers' interpretation of 
its policy) simply fails to conform and comply with applicable Utah law which requires (1) 
two separate single person policy limits and (2) that ambiguities in the policy be read in 
favor of coverage. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law. 
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I. The Decision Below Conflicts With The Married Woman's Act And The 
Utah Constitution, 
While it is true that in a bygone era, a wife's personal injury claim was legally the 
property of her husband, that unfortunate notion was corrected in this jurisdiction shortly 
after Utah was admitted to the Union. The Married Woman's Act which originated inl 898 
states: "There shall be no right of recovery by the husband on account of personal injury or 
wrong to his wife, or for expenses connected therewith, but the wife may recover against 
a third person for such injury or wrong as if unmarried " Utah Code Ann. §30-2-4 
(Emphasis added). Similarly, the Constitution of Utah states: "Both male and female 
citizens of this State shall enjoy all civil.. • rights and privileges." Constitution of Utah, 
Article IV Section 1 (Emphasis added). 
In a case decided under the Married Woman's Act before 1997 (i.e., before a right 
to recover for loss of consortium was legislatively established in Utah), this Court noted that 
despite the lack (at that time) of loss of consortium claims "the Married Woman's Act was 
. . . intended . . . to place men and women on equal footing with respect to their ability 
to bring actions for their own injuries and to extinguish the concept that a wife was the 
property of her husband." Cruz v. Wright. 765 P.2d 869, 871 (Utah 1988) (Emphasis 
added). 
The Married Woman's Act, the Utah Constitution, and this Court's jurisprudence all 
recognize husbands and wives as separate persons, each with the distinct right to enjoy all 
civil rights and privileges. It is settled that a husband has no more right to a claim for the 
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personal injuries sustained by his wife than she has a right to his. Neither a wife's claim, nor 
a husband's claim, is owned by the other. 
The Married Woman's Act is important here because it states that "the wife may 
recover against a third person for such injury or wrong as if unmarried." Utah Code Ann. 
§30-2-4 (Emphasis added). Therefore, regardless of her marital status, Mrs. Vierra can 
recover against Mr. Versaw for the injuries she suffered. If Mrs. Vierra has an excess policy 
limit claim and is yet willing to accept a single person policy limit in settlement of her 
personal claim, she is entitled to do so. She cannot be penalized by Farmers in her ability 
to settle because (1) she is married and (2) she is injured so severely that her husband has 
a separate claim for loss of consortium. 
For purposes of the underlying Declaratory Action, Farmers accepted as true certain 
facts. (R. at 160-1, 205 and 231.) Mrs. Vierra suffered a closed head injury on October 7, 
1998 in an automobile collision with Mr. Versaw. (R. at 161.) At the time of the collision, 
she was an employee of the Federal Aviation Administration and since then has been unable 
to return to her job or seek other employment. (R. at 161.) Mr. Vierra's loss of consortium 
claim is based on a loss of financial support pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-2-1 l(l)(a)(iii) 
because his wife sustained a significant permanent injury which has substantially changed 
her lifestyle in that since the collision Mrs. Vierra has been and remains incapable of 
performing the types of jobs she performed prior to the collision. (R. at 161.) 
The stipulated facts also establish significant special damages. For example, as of 
January 2000 Mrs. Vierra's medical bills were $25,070 and her lost wages were $50,248. 
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(R. at 161.) Between January 2000 and the hearing before the trial court on April 12,2002, 
her per diem lost wage of $ 121.00 amounted to $96,800. (R. at 161.) As of that hearing, 
the total special damages sustained by Mrs. Vierra because of Mr. Versaw's negligence 
exceeded $171,000. (R. at 254, p. 26.) This amount does not include Mrs. Vierra's general 
damages nor her per diem lost wages after April 12, 2002. 
Given these damages and the fact that Mr. Versaw has an automobile liability 
insurance policy with limits of only $30,000 per person, it is beyond debate, at least for 
purposes of the Declaratory Action, that Mrs. Vierra has a claim against Mr. Versaw which 
is worth in excess of a $30,000 single person policy limit. Nevertheless, Mrs. Vierra's offer 
to settle her excess policy limit personal injury claim with Mr. Versaw for a single person 
policy limit was thwarted by Farmers solely because she is married. 
The Married Woman's Act is impacted here because Mrs. Vierra offered to settle her 
claims against Mr. Versaw for a single person policy limit of $30,000. (R. at 161.) Farmers 
responded in kind with a $30,000 offer to Mrs. Vierra, but conditioned its offer on her 
husband's release of his separate loss of consortium claim. (R. at 161.) Simply put, Farmers 
is forcing Mrs. Vierra to share a claim with her husband that it would never require her to 
share if she were single. 
The trial court's agreement with Farmers' position wrongly holds hostage Mrs. 
Vierra's settlement. Utah law simply does not permit Farmers to force Mrs. Vierra to share 
with her husband the single person policy limit she offered to accept any more than the law 
allows her husband to demand a share of her personal injury claim. Therefore, Farmers has 
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created, and the trial court has upheld, an irreconcilable conflict between the rights of 
husbands and wives that violates the Utah Constitution, the Married Woman's Act, and as 
explained next, Utah's financial responsibility statutes which, based on the language of 
Farmers' policy, must all be read and construed together. 
II. The Decision Below Also Conflicts With Utah's Financial Responsibility 
Law. 
In addition to offending the Married Woman's Act and the Utah Constitution, 
Farmers' effort to reduce the claims of both Mrs. and Mr. Vierra into a single person policy 
limit (at great hazard to Mr. Versaw) is contrary to Utah insurance law. "Every policy of 
insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security 
requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall include: (a) motor vehicle liability coverage under 
Sections 31A-22-303 and 31A-22-304 " Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-302(l). These 
statutory coverage and minimum coverage requirements are discussed in turn. 
A. Utah Law Requires Farmers To Provide Liability Coverage For 
Loss Of Consortium Claims. 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-303 requires Farmers to provide coverage for liability 
imposed by Utah law: "a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage . . . shall.. . insure the 
person named in the policy . . . against loss from the liability imposed by law for 
damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the motor vehicle...." Utah 
Code Ann. §31A-22-303(l)(a)(ii)(A) (Emphasis added.) 
The "liability imposed by law" under Section 31A-22-303 includes the liability 
created by the Legislature when it enacted Utah's Loss of Consortium Act, Utah Code Ann. 
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§30-2-11. This statute imposes liability in favor of the husband or wife who sustains a loss 
of consortium by reason of his or her spouse being significantly injured. Utah's Loss of 
Consortium Act states, in part: "The spouse of a person injured by a third party on or 
after May 4,1997, may maintain an action against the third party to recover for loss of 
consortium." Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11 (Emphasis added.) There is no exemption here 
for liability for injuries caused by automobile accidents. Therefore, Utah Code Ann. §31A-
22-303 requires Farmers to provide coverage against liability for losses of consortium 
arising from automobile accidents. 
B. The Total Required Minimum Liability Coverage Available To 
Mr. Versaw Is $60,000 And Not $30,000. 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-304 requires the following minimum liability coverage: 
Policies containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not 
limit the insurer's liability under that coverage below the 
following: 
(1) (a) $25,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or 
death of one person, arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any 
one accident; 
(b) subject to the limit for one person in Subsection (a), in 
the amount of $50,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or 
death of two or more persons arising out of the use of a motor 
vehicle in any one accident; and 
(c) in the amount of $ 15,000 because of liability for injury 
to, or destruction of, property of others arising out of the use of a motor 
vehicle in any one accident; or 
(2) $65,000 in any one accident whether arising from bodily injury 
to or the death of others, or from destruction of, or damage to, the 
property of others. 
(Emphasis added.) 
-14-
Thus, under §31A-22-304 Farmers can market two insurance products which satisfy 
Utah's minimum insurance coverage requirements. First, it can sell policies that provide 
coverage of at least "$25,000 because of liability for bodily injury... to one person" so long 
as it also provides coverage of at least "$50,000 because of liability for bodily injury to . . 
. two or more persons." Second, Farmers can offer "single limit" policies with total 
coverage of at least $65,000 for any one accident. 
If Farmers had sold Mr. Versaw a "single limit" policy in the amount of $65,000 or 
more, then, under Section 31A-22-304(2), the Vierra's respective claims would properly 
compete for the same policy limit based on their relative merit. In such a situation, the 
Married Woman's Act would not be impacted. Mr. Versaw, however, was not sold a single 
limit policy. Farmers sold Mr. Versaw a policy under Section 31 A-22-304(l). Therefore, 
it "may not limit [its] liability under that coverage."1 Utah Code Ann. §31 A-22-304. In 
other words, this statute requires Farmers to indemnify Mr. Versaw against the liability he 
faces for Mrs. Vierra's personal injuries up to the amount of his first single person limit and 
it must separately indemnify Mr. Versaw up to the amount of his second single person limit 
for the liability he faces as a result of Mr. Vierra's loss of consortium. 
Farmers may argue that Mr. Vierra has no claim under Section 31 A-22-304 because 
he suffered no bodily injury. Such faulty logic, however, soon fails because Section 31A-
1
 By interpreting and treating loss of consortium claims and personal injury 
claims as if they are the same claim in the "per person" / "per occurrence" context, Farmers 
is actually marketing an insurance product to customers that by definition does not provide 
its insureds with the minimal coverage required by Utah's insurance statutes. 
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22-303(1 )(a)(ii) requires Farmers to insure Mr. Versaw against liability imposed by law for 
operating a motor vehicle, including the liability imposed by the Loss of Consortium Act. 
Indeed, Farmers has admitted that Mr. Vierra's claim is covered by the policy it sold Mr. 
Versaw. (R. at 205-6.) Therefore, any adequate interpretation of Section 31A-22-303 (as 
that provision is read in conjunction with Section 31 A-22-303( 1 )(a)(ii)) requires, as Farmers 
admits, that it indemnify Mr. Versaw against the liability imposed by Mr. Vierra's loss of 
consortium claim even though Mr. Vierra suffered no injury in the collision.2 
Farmers argued to the trial court that the Vierras' claims are not separate because, in 
enacting the loss of consortium statute, the legislature did not change the financial 
responsibility laws and because the financial responsibility laws do not "say that loss of 
consortium will be a separate claim." (R. at 24-5.) That level of specificity is not necessary. 
The Legislature was presumably mindful of Utah's financial responsibly laws when it 
enacted the loss of consortium statute. The issue, therefore, is not whether the law expressly 
"says" that a loss of consortium claim is a separate claim; the issue is how the governing law 
"treats" such a claim. This is apparent from the language of Farmers' policy itself, which 
states: "If the financial responsibility law of the place of the accident treats the loss of 
2
 It should be noted that emotional and psychological injuries, such as those 
arising from a significant loss of financial support, are well recognized in the law of loss of 
consortium. Although such injuries may not be physical in nature, that does not mean that 
they are any less pronounced. It is well established in Utah that psychological and physical 
injuries are not distinct in terms of the impact they can have on victims. Jones v. Carvell 
641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982). 
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consortium as a separate claim, financial responsibility limits will be furnished." (R. at 186, 
emphasis added.) 
Reading Utah's financial responsibility statutes together and with the Married 
Woman's Act, it is clear that as the result of the automobile collision in question, both Mrs. 
Vierra and Mr. Vierra have separate and distinct injury claims. The total liability coverage 
available to Mr. Versaw for Mrs. and Mr. Vierra's per person claims as a result of this 
occurrence is $60,000, not $30,000 as though the Vierras were a single person with a single 
claim. 
III. The Decision Below Also Violates Utah's Loss Of Consortium Act. 
Not only are loss of consortium claims separate from personal injury claims under the 
Married Woman's Act, Utah's Constitution and Utah's financial responsibility laws, they 
are treated as separate and distinct claims under the Loss of Consortium Act itself. Utah 
Code Ann. §30-2-11, states with emphasis added: 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "injury" or "injured" means a significant permanent injury to a 
person that substantially changes that person's lifestyle and includes 
the following: 
(i) a partial or complete paralysis of one or more of the 
extremities; 
(ii) significant disfigurement; or 
(iii) incapability of the person of performing the types of jobs 
the person performed before the injury; and 
(b) "spouse" means the legal relationship: 
(i) established between a man and a woman as recognized 
by the laws of this state; and 
(ii) existing at the time of the person's injury. 
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(2) The spouse of a person injured by a third party on or after May 4, 
1997, may maintain an action against the third party to recover for loss 
of consortium. 
(3) A claim for loss of consortium begins on the date of injury to the 
spouse. The statute of limitations applicable to the injured person shall also 
apply to the spouse's claim of loss of consortium. 
(4) A claim for the spouse's loss of consortium shall be: 
(a) made at the time the claim of the injured person is made and 
joinder of actions shall be compulsory; and 
(b) subject to the same defenses, limitations, immunities, and 
provisions applicable to the claims of the injured person. 
(5) The spouse's action for loss of consortium: 
(a) shall be derivative from the cause of action existing in behalf of 
the injured person; and 
(b) may not exist in cases where the injured person would not have 
a cause of action. 
(6) Fault of the spouse of the injured person, as well as fault of the injured 
person, shall be compared with the fault of all other parties, pursuant to 
Section 78-27-37 through 78-27-43, for purposes of reducing or barring any 
recovery by the spouse for loss of consortium. 
(7) Damages awarded for loss of consortium, when combined with any 
award to the injured person for general damages, may not exceed any 
applicable statutory limit on noneconomic damages, including 
Section 78-14-7.1. 
(8) Damages awarded for loss of consortium which a governmental 
entity is required to pay, when combined with any award to the injured 
person which a governmental entity is required to pay, may not exceed the 
liability limit for one person in any one occurrence under Title 63, 
Chapter 30, Governmental Immunity Act. 
On its face, Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4) creates a cause of action for the "spouse of 
a person injured." The fact that the statute refers separately to the claim of the physically 
injured person and the claim of the nonphysically injured spouse shows that the Legislature 
intended that they be treated as separate claims. The further fact that the statute requires 
"joinder of actions" in the plural, indicates that each action is separate. Further, Section 30-
2-11(8) specifically states that loss of consortium claims made against governmental 
-18-
agencies are subject to the per person limit of liability contained in Title 63, Chapter 30 of 
the Governmental Immunity Act. The statute contains no such limitation on liability for 
nongovernment defendants such as Mr. Versaw. Therefore, the loss of consortium statute 
clearly treats a loss of consortium claim against a private individual or entity as a separate 
claim.3 
IV. Farmers' "Derivative" Argument is Defective as a Matter of Law. 
Before the trial court, Farmers emphasized the "derivative" nature of loss of 
consortium claims and argued, that because they are derivative, loss of consortium claims 
do not actually give rise to separate claims. The trial court erred by agreeing. The result of 
the trial court's ruling is to force Mrs. Vierra to share a claim with her husband that she 
would never be required to share or diminish if she were single. This problem is not 
resolved by Farmers' assertion that Mr. Vierra's claim is "derivative." 
Sixteen years ago, in Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 
1987), this Court held that a husband could not maintain a loss of consortium claim because 
such a claim did not exist at common law. In a dissent, Justice Durham discussed the nature 
of loss of consortium claims. Ten years later, the Legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. §30-
2-11, and created a statutory loss of consortium cause of action. Justice Durham's dissenting 
opinion in Hackford is particularly persuasive now. In it she wrote: 
3
 This point is underscored by Farmers through its previous (and anticipated) 
reliance on cases and statutes from other jurisdictions. Had the Utah legislature intended to 
make a loss of consortium claim subject to the same single or per person policy limit, it 
would have expressly done so by statute, as have some state legislatures. It did not. 
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The cause of action for loss of consortium is a separate and distinct action 
that belongs to the nonphysically injured spouse, [citation omitted] Although 
the action is nominally derivative in the limited sense that it arose out of or 
was occasioned by an injury to the spouse, an action for loss of consortium is 
in fact an action for the direct injury to the plaintiff spouse. . . . 
Hackford. 740 P.2d at 1290 (Durham, J., dissenting, emphasis added).4 
Therefore, while these claims are necessarily derivative - they obviously cannot and 
do not arise absent serious bodily injury to a spouse - once a loss of consortium claim does 
arise, it is unmistakably a separate and distinct claim. Although loss of consortium claims 
are derivative in the limited sense that they are subject to the same tort defenses which apply 
to the claims of physically injured spouses, that rationale simply does not logically extend 
to subject spouses with loss of consortium claims to the same single person policy limit 
available to their physically injured spouses. 
Because Utah law treats a loss of consortium as a separate claim, the policy sold to 
Mr. Versaw must do so as well. 
V. Farmers' Policy Language Is Ambiguous And Must Be Construed In 
Favor Of Coverage. 
Farmers policy language places on insureds, who are typically lay persons like Mr. 
Versaw, the burden of knowing and interpreting the law as it relates to the issue now before 
4
 Justice Durham also addressed the misguided argument that a cause of action 
by the nonphysically injured spouse would result in a double recovery. She noted that the 
problem with this argument is that "it is based on the mistaken assumption that the husband 
and the wife are seeking recovery for the same wrong. It ignores the fact that the injury to 
consortium is a separate and distinct loss to the nonphysically injured spouse." Hackford. 
740 P.2d at 1294 (Durham, J., dissenting) (emphasis added.) 
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this Court. Although Farmers' policy states that loss of consortium claims and bodily injury 
claims are subject to a single person limit, it flags this coverage flaw and brings the question 
full circle by further stating: "If the financial responsibility law of the place of the accident 
treats the loss of consortium as a separate claim, financial responsibility limits will be 
furnished." (R. at 184.) Thus, Farmers' policy language is not only ambiguous, it creates 
ambiguity because it is virtually impossible for lay persons to know what they are buying. 
This policy language forces Farmers' insureds to either remain uncertain as to whether they 
are receiving the coverages they are entitled to under Utah law, or undertake a burdensome 
and costly interpretation of the law. 
The fact that Farmers takes one position while Mr. Versaw takes another, 
demonstrates the inherent ambiguity resulting from policy language which attempts to say 
one thing and then modifies that by an express incorporation of Utah's financial 
responsibility and loss of consortium law. 
Another problem with Farmers' single person limit position arises from a further 
conflict and ambiguity in Farmers' policy. Contrary to language attempting to treat loss of 
consortium claims as one with bodily injury claims, Farmers' policy states: "We will pay 
damages for which any insured person is legally liable because of an occurrence arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of your insured car.11 (R. at 182.) (Emphasis 
added.) This language promising protection for "liability because of an occurrence" is much 
broader than Farmers' interpretation of the available coverage limits. Therefore, with this 
provision, more ambiguity is created. 
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Farmers must indemnify Mr. Versaw separately against the liability imposed by law 
for the claims made by both Mrs. and Mr. Vierra. It is well settled that provisions which 
exclude or limit coverage should be strictly construed against the insurer. US Fidelity and 
Guaranty Co. v. Sandt 854 P. 2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993). "The corollary to this rule is that 
ambiguous or uncertain language in an insurance contract that is fairly susceptible to 
different interpretations should be construed in favor of coverage." U.S. Fidelity, at 854 
P.2d at 522. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 
judgment should be entered in favor of Mr. Versaw and the Vierras. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of January, 2003. 
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DON VERSAW, ARTHUR VIERA 
AND CORINA VIERA, 
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JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000910102 
Judge Roger Livingston 
The parties hereto, by counsel, appeared before the Court on 
April 12, 2002, and the Court, having read the memoranda filed by 
all of the parties, having heard argument from counsel for the 
plaintiff and for defendant Don Versaw and for defendants Arthur 
Viera and Corina Viera on the Motions for Judgment on the 
Pleadings filed by all parties, and the Court having considered 
oral argument and the memoranda of the parties, and being of the 
opinion that the language of the policy of automobile liability 
insurance issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange to Don Versaw 
unambiguously states that a single limit of liability coverage of 
$30,000 applies to both a personal injury claim and a loss of 
consortium claim and that such language of the policy complies 
with Utah law, including §31A-22-304 and §30-2-11, Utah Code 
Annotated, 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED that for the 
reasons set forth in plaintiff's memoranda filed on this issue, 
the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings of plaintiff is granted 
and the Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings of defendant Don 
Versaw and defendants Arthur Viera and Corina Viera, are denied, 
the parties to bear their own costs. 
I hereby certify that on this ) j^" day of July, 2002, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed JUDGMENT was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
H. Michael Drake 
SUITTER AXLAND 
Attorneys for Defendant Versaw 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Roger H. Hoole 
HOOLE & KING 
Attorneys for Defendants Viera 
4276 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
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